{"id":2493,"date":"2018-01-23T14:34:38","date_gmt":"2018-01-23T13:34:38","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blog.nccr-onthemove.ch\/?p=2493"},"modified":"2018-01-23T14:34:38","modified_gmt":"2018-01-23T13:34:38","slug":"the-european-parliament-and-the-reform-of-the-dublin-system-bold-but-pragmatic","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nccr-onthemove.ch\/blog\/the-european-parliament-and-the-reform-of-the-dublin-system-bold-but-pragmatic\/?lang=fr","title":{"rendered":"The European Parliament and the Reform of the Dublin System: Bold but Pragmatic?"},"content":{"rendered":"

This is a shortened version of a more comprehensive post, which was originally published on the blog \u201cEU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy\u201d managed by the\u00a0Odysseus Academic Network<\/a>\u00a0(20 December 2017). For the full version\u00a0:\u00a0see here<\/a>. Pour la version int\u00e9grale fran\u00e7aise,\u00a0cliquez ici<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

A new chapter is being written in the troubled history of the Dublin system. (Hastily) declared dead at the height of the crisis\u2019 of 2015, it has been (belatedly) judged unfit for purpose by a whole range of actors including the European Commission and Parliament. A fundamental reform has therefore been placed on the agenda as matter of urgency.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Commission\u00a0Dublin IV Proposal<\/a>\u00a0of May 2016 (examined\u00a0here<\/a>), however, did not propose a fundamental reform of the system. To the contrary, it retained all the structural elements that doomed the system to failure: its disregard for the needs, aspirations and life circumstances of applicants; its unfairness towards border and \u201cfirst application\u201d States; and its na\u00efve trust in the willingness of Member States to cooperate in sharing responsibilities.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, reception has not been good among commentators and Council and Parliament have not been enthusiastic either. While the Council is still mired in internal disagreement, the\u00a0European Parliament<\/a>\u00a0has adopted as basis for inter-institutional negotiations a document that is highly critical of the Dublin IV Proposal: the \u201cWikstr\u00f6m Report<\/a>\u201d.<\/p>\n

The report is meant to constitute a \u201cbold but pragmatic proposal\u201d. It certainly is bold: the boldest official proposal ever submitted for the reform of responsibility allocation. It replaces the \u201csanctions-based\u201d approach of the Commission with an \u201cincentives-based\u201d approach. Furthermore, it introduces permanent and automatic quota-based allocation. It is more questionable that the proposal is pragmatic. In the following, we analyze whether it would be capable of \u201cworking in practice\u201d as claimed.<\/p>\n

An \u201cIncentives-Based\u201d Model of Responsibility Allocation<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Reform of the Dublin Criteria<\/em><\/p>\n

An important element is the reform of the Dublin criteria. The whole hierarchy of criteria is re-centered on the \u201cgenuine links\u201d that applicants may have with particular Member States. Thus, the family criteria are significantly expanded and other \u201cgenuine links\u201d are introduced. Critically, the criterion of irregular entry is deleted.<\/p>\n

The logic of these amendments is to encourage persons to apply in the first State entered into: they (should) remove the prospect of being \u201cstuck\u201d in the first port of entry, and enhance the prospect of being transferred to a desirable destination. A further, far-reaching amendment is the reform of the rule that applies by default when none of the criteria is applicable. As the law stands, the State where the first application had been lodged is responsible. To break the incentives that this may create for applicants to travel on to their preferred destination and to promote a fairer sharing of responsibilities among Member States, the \u201cWikstr\u00f6m Report\u201d would replace this rule with the automatic allocation of responsibility to the \u201cleast burdened\u201d State(s).<\/p>\n

The Permanent Allocation Mechanism<\/em><\/p>\n

By becoming the default rule, \u201ccorrective allocation\u201d becomes permanent \u2013 not anymore a \u201ccrisis\u201d mechanism as per the Commission proposal. Permanent allocation further incorporates new features intended to promote acceptance and cooperation on the applicants\u2019 side:<\/p>\n