Most Welcome: Why Ukrainians Are Treated Differently

In recent times, within Europe, the massive inflow of asylum seekers is as unprecedented as the openness with which the Ukrainian ones are being welcomed. While structural racism is certainly at play, political interests and alignments between domestic, political ideologies and international relations also have a prominent role in the situation. In the light of this re-politicization of asylum, extending extraordinary acceptance measures to non-Ukrainians might prove more difficult than many hope.

The figures that are being processed by quantitative researchers testify to the exceptionality of the response to the current refugees and asylum seekers in comparison to previous inflows. Certainly, both the events providing the root causes, and the mass movements themselves, have impacted, are impacting, and will impact Western countries even more than previously declared ‘crises.’

Ukraine has a large population – 44 million people – and at least 19 out of its 24 regions have been directly impacted by the war (at the time of writing). Besides being more populous than Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan respectively, Ukraine is also closer and easier to travel from. These factors increase the numbers independently of the political reaction and from the way the conflict evolves.

Differences in responses are blatant, as the Temporary Protection Directive was activated for the first time to offer Ukrainians a quick and effective shelter in the EU. Although critical discussions on the terms and limits of this legal instrument are also occuring. However, the clearest disparity in these inflows is the way asylum seekers and refugees belonging to the latter rather than the former have (not) been welcomed. Several factors may at least partly explain the differences in treatment.

Welcoming Policies Are Not Entirely New

To cast light on this divergence, one should be reminded that the especially ‘open’ and ‘welcoming’ reaction is not unique in the history of recent refugee crises. Matthew Gibney already identified some of the decisive factors in his August 1999 article about Kosovo. Kosovars, however, do not fit the ideal of nativist politicians and the public in at least one important respect, that is, being mostly Muslim.

Ukrainians are closer and related to Europeans in ways other refugees and asylum seekers are not – similarly to the Kosovars at the time. Ukraine is also geographically closer to Europe. It has additionally voiced its aspirations for NATO and EU membership, which would further integrate it into the destination countries currently welcoming refugees, although both accessions seem unlikely in the near future.

The Ukrainian government sympathizes with the West and as such, it opposes Vladimir Putin’s Russia. All these factors explain why Ukrainians are perceived as ‘one of us,’ at least from the point of view of the EU/Schengen countries (most of which belong to NATO or have anyways been listed among the unfriendly by Russia). Additionally, Ukrainian migrants and workers have already moved to the West before the war started, forming large networks there.

Furthermore, Europe is related to Ukraine through its cultural and historical connections to other Eastern European states, in particular Poland and Hungary. Communities from post-Soviet states, namely Moldova or Georgia, are also well represented in Western Europe and they establish yet another bridge with the fate of the Ukrainians. Indeed, since 2008 the Russo-Georgian war sensitized Western countries to the fate of asylum seekers from the post-Soviet space, and in recent years the number of Georgian applicants has greatly increased (even tripled in the case of Germany, while a general decrease in refugee numbers was noted).

Racism Plays a Role But so Does Politics

In terms of relatedness, many people can feel related to the Ukrainians for reasons that are more or less questionable, both morally and politically. Serena Parekh talks explicitly of ‘structural racism’, and Janine Dahinden also provides a scathing critique of the double standards in this very blog series. In some circles, the fact that Ukrainians are perceived to be mostly white and Christian plays a very important role, as does the fact that they are assumed to be supporters of Western values against Russia.

But relatedness is not limited to ethnic, cultural, or racial identity politics. It is also established by the fear of Russian, and previously Soviet, aggression that is or has historically been felt in countries bordering Russia, or otherwise belonging to the West. Parekh calls it a geopolitical factor (Parekh 2022). Even if Russia would not attack these countries, many Westerners feel like they are in the same situation as the Ukrainians. That is, under pressure from the East and required to defend themselves and their values, for which Ukraine has become the example. Since the time of Michael Walzer’s seminal article on migration and refuge (Walzer 1981, 1983), those who became refugees as part of a conflict to which countries of asylum had contributed, such as the Vietnamese, were deemed to be deserving of protection, even by staunch communitarians.

Finally, a related factor to Gibney’s analysis, is the political nature, interest, and identity dynamics at play. This is especially transparent in the media. In the initial stages of the war, there seems to have been a clear and omnipresent narrative – the war was constantly on the front page due to its closeness and relevance – in which the borders of good and evil, as well as the relative roles – those of the victim, the aggressor, and the expected helper – are all very clearly drawn. As other forms of help seemed complicated or even unfeasable, such as letting Ukraine enter NATO/the EU, going to war with Russia, or establishing a no-fly zone, Westerners feel deeply moved at the very least to welcome Ukrainian refugees and provide humanitarian support.

A Compelling Narrative about Victims and Perpetrators

This contrasts sharply with previous crises, such as the Iraqi or Afghani wars, where the picture was perceived as more complex. On at least some occasions and depending on the standpoint, the West was seen as playing a much more ambiguous and sometimes disruptive role, and the connections with domestic interests were often unclear to the general public. Also, there potentially seemed to be alternative ways of helping, and the armed interventions themselves were presented as generous, helpful, and even humanitarian by their proponents. As those crises took place relatively far from Europe and seemed not to threaten Western security directly, the media coverage and the corresponding perception of urgency in welcoming refugees, who would also take much longer to arrive, were relatively less extensive and intense.

Openings Are Likely to Remain Selective

This analysis does not provide a normative, nor even evaluative response on whether such differential treatment could ever be justified, or whether Western states should reassess their response to asylum seekers in the light of what they are finding themselves able to do for Ukrainians. Still, it clarifies the political dynamics and salient factors at play. Public opinion and national governments all across Europe have turned monolithically anti-Russian, since the beginning of the conflict.

If the welcoming of Ukrainians is greatly due to political motives – the friend/enemy divide – and considering the resource depletion of continuous crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and now this war, requests to broaden reception beyond Ukrainian refugees are likely to be met with explicit or implicit resistance.

Dario Mazzola is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Bergen (UiB), Department of Comparative Politics, and Executive Scientific Coordinator of the H2020 PROTECT Project (funded from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No 870761). He researches the right to asylum from a normative yet realistic perspective, with a special focus on the Global Compacts.

References

– Parekh, Serena (interviewed by Khalid S.). ‘Q&A: Understanding Europe’s response to Ukrainian refugee crisis’. AlJazeera. March 10th, 2022. Last accessed April 29th, 2022.
– Walzer, Michael. ‘The Distribution of Membershi’, in Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue, eds., Boundaries: National Autonomy and Its Limits, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa 1981.
– Walzer, Michael. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, Basic Books, New York 1983.