Post-Assad Syria: What Lies Ahead for Syrian Refugees in Europe?
With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, statements concerning the fate of Syrian asylum seekers and refugees in Europe have proliferated. Beyond these heated reactions, the regime’s collapse raises critical sociological, legal, and political questions that scientific research could help address. In an optimistic scenario for Syria, will Syrian refugees return to their home country? Will they be forced to do so?
A few hours after the fall of the regime, leaders of radical right-wing populist parties – some of whom had openly supported Assad – called for the immediate return of Syrian refugees while simultaneously raising the alarm over a potential “migration flood.” At the same time, several European governments suspended decisions on asylum applications from Syrians, raising concerns among refugee organizations.
While this suspension is understandable in principle – authorities cannot base decisions on an outdated and highly volatile situation – the haste with which it was communicated is questionable. It seems more aimed at appeasing the electorate of the populist radical right than addressing the concerns of the broader population, let alone the refugees themselves. Furthermore, the suspension must not be indefinitely prolonged, as this could plunge those concerned into unbearable legal uncertainty.
In the longer term, and assuming an optimistic scenario for Syria, the focus will shift to the fate of the hundreds of thousands of people who fled the Syrian civil war to seek refuge in Europe: almost one million in Germany, over 150,000 in Sweden, around 100,000 in the Netherlands and Austria, and around 25,000 in Switzerland. This issue is also relevant for the international refugee regime, as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) identifies voluntary repatriation as one of the three “durable solutions” to forced displacement.
Will Syrians Return? Insights From Research
Research on voluntary return after forced migration – less developed than studies on return intentions after voluntary migration – underscores the primacy of safety conditions in countries of origin (Black et al. 2004). In contrast to the predictions of traditional push-pull models, individuals who fled violence and persecution consider returning only once safety conditions improve beyond certain thresholds (Alrababah et al. 2023), and when the rule of law and human rights are ensured. Thus, Syrian refugees’ intentions to return will largely depend on the willingness and ability of the new authorities to establish lasting peace in Syria.
Once safety conditions improve beyond certain thresholds, differences in livelihood conditions between the host country and the homeland – often correlated with geographic distance – become significant. Refugees compare access to jobs, housing, and essential public services like education, healthcare, water, and electricity. For instance, a recent study shows that Syrian respondents in Turkey were more likely to indicate their willingness to return than those who had made it to Germany, also suggesting that the selection of a host country itself influences return considerations (Al Husein et al. 2023).
At the individual level, evidence regarding age, gender, education, and income remains mixed, whereas family circumstances and social connections are consistently decisive factors. The presence of children educated in the host country strongly influences decisions to remain, as the desire to provide children with better education and future opportunities is often cited as a key reason for not returning (Al Husein et al. 2023). On the other hand, having family or social networks in the home country is positively and significantly associated with the decision to return (Alrababah et al. 2023; Arias et al. 2014).
Perhaps more counterintuitively, research indicates that local integration does not necessarily discourage return, suggesting that longer stays, education, employment, and training in host countries may equip refugees for sustainable return (Harild et al. 2015). Moreover, it invites us not to consider refugee return as a permanent and one-time event but as a dynamic and iterative process. Displaced families and communities often divide responsibilities, sending some members to assess conditions and lay the groundwork for a broader return over a longer period, often involving continued mobility between host and origin countries (Eastmond 2006; Harild et al. 2015)
Will Forced Return Occur? The Legal Framework
The 1951 Refugee Convention provides for a “cessation clause” stipulating that refugees can no longer refuse to avail themselves of the protection of their state of origin when the circumstances in connection with which they have been recognized as refugees have ceased to exist. However, the application of this clause is subject to strict requirements. The change in circumstances must be “fundamental, stable and durable” according to the UNHCR guidelines and “sufficiently significant and non-provisional” under European law. It presupposes the existence of an effective and accessible legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution. Even under the most optimistic scenarios, it will thus take considerable time for Syria to meet these criteria.
In addition, the examination of the revocation of asylum or refugee status under the cessation clause must adhere to the same standards as those applied during the initial protection determination, which involves a case-by-case assessment based on the actual local circumstances and the personal situation (Thym 2024). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) speaks of “parallelism” between the two procedures. In those circumstances, European host countries are unlikely to pursue mass revocations of the refugee status, as such actions could quickly overwhelm their asylum bureaucracies, not to mention their judicial systems.
In any case, the impact of asylum revocation would depend on the legal status of refugees in each host country, which has become more stable for many individuals due to the protracted nature of the Syrian conflict. In countries with inclusive naturalization policies, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, many Syrians have acquired citizenship and are thus non-deportable. For non-naturalized individuals, the loss of refugee status would mean the loss of absolute protection against refoulement, but not necessarily the withdrawal of their residence permit, which would remain subject to the criteria laid down in national legislation, such as the absence of crimes or offenses, or non-dependence on social assistance.
In the hypothetical event of a fundamental and durable security improvement in Syria, those most at risk of removal would likely be individuals with precarious legal statuses, such as asylum seekers with pending decisions or those under temporary forms of protection. In Switzerland, for example, holders of F permits could face the lifting of their provisional admission. For these groups, the designation of all or specific Syrian regions as “safe” by host countries will be decisive.
Finally, the Refugee Convention stipulates that it ceases to apply when refugees voluntarily re-avail themselves of their country’s protection. Crucially, rigid and automatic interpretations of this principle – such as the revocation of refugee status after a single visit to the country of origin, as found in national legislations of many European states – could hinder return. Fear of losing status may discourage exploratory visits, which research shows are often critical to eventual, permanent repatriation (Eastmond 2006).
Balancing Return, Integration, and Policy Implications
In summary, a significant number of Syrian refugees in Europe may choose to return to Syria if long-term security improvements materialize, but European and national legal frameworks should provide safeguards against forced returns of individuals who fled a country devastated by over a decade of conflict, as well as a half-century of the Assad’s family dictatorship.
Yet, if the aim is to encourage a return to Syria, policymakers should acknowledge that local integration in host countries and return, as a dynamic and iterative process, are not mutually exclusive. Transnational solutions facilitating mobility and maintaining connections to Syria, such as easing legal rules for “go-and-see” visits and the provision of reintegration support, should inform policies on return and reconstruction.
Dr. Robin Stünzi is Senior Researcher at the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies and the Education, Careers and Equal Opportunities Officer of the nccr – on the move at the University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland.
References:
–Al Husein, N., & Wagner, N. (2023). Determinants of Intended Return Migration among Refugees: A Comparison of Syrian Refugees in Germany and Turkey. International Migration Review, 57(4), 1771-1805.
–Alrababah A, Masterson D, Casalis M, Hangartner D, Weinstein J. (2023). The Dynamics of Refugee Return: Syrian Refugees and Their Migration Intentions. British Journal of Political Science, 53(4):1108-1131.
–Arias, MA, Ibáñez, AM and Querubin, P (2014) The desire to return during civil war: evidence for internally displaced populations in Colombia. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 20(1), 209–233
–Eastmond, M. (2006). Transnational returns and reconstruction in post‐war Bosnia and Herzegovina. International Migration, 44(3), 141-166.
–Harild, N., Christensen, A., & Zetter, R. (2015). Sustainable refugee return. World Bank.
–Thym, D. (2024). Abschiebungen nach Syrien?: Ein pragmatischer Mittelweg, VerfBlog, 2024/12/11.
