Syrian Refugee Return: Views from the Ground in Jordan

16.04.2025 , in ((Politics)) , ((No Comments))

After the Assad regime fell in December 2024, several European governments swiftly announced they would suspend asylum processing for Syrians. Yet, the pressure for refugee returns had existed well before the regime’s fall. In Jordan, local NGOs highlight ongoing concerns about who is responsible for ensuring that refugee returns are voluntary, safe, and dignified, and emphasize the need for clearer roles among international, regional and national actors.

On 8 December 2024, after 53 years, the Assad regime in Syria fell. Barely a day later, several European governments wasted no time in announcing that they would suspend asylum processing for Syrians (Dhingra & Mourad, 2025). This hardening stance was underscored by voices like Alice Weidel from Germany’s far-right AfD party, who suggested that “[w]hoever in Germany celebrates a ‘free Syria’ obviously has no reason any more to have fled […] [and] should go back to Syria immediately” (McGuinness, 2024).

However, the pressure to return did not emerge solely in the post-regime fall, nor was it limited to Europe. Long before December 2024, major host states – particularly Lebanon and Turkey, and to a lesser extent Jordan – pressured Syrian refugees to return (Abboud, 2024), and since 2019, the Syrian regime itself has actively promoted the repatriation of refugees  (Dinçer & Şahin-Mencütek, 2025).

Who is Responsible for Voluntary, Safe, and Dignified Repatriation?

The UNHCR leads refugee repatriation operations, and its handbook outlines practical approaches for protecting refugees during these operations. It particularly emphasizes the principles of voluntary, safe, dignified and orderly repatriation. However, in light of the current push for return, as outlined above, one might ask: Is this definition still relevant? How do local actors perceive it, and who is responsible for ensuring that repatriation is voluntary, safe, dignified and orderly?

To gain deeper insight into these issues, we interviewed 21 NGOs operating on the local city level in Jordan. Their responses shed light on the complexities of return, especially regarding who holds responsibility for ensuring refugees’ rights and safety. One NGO representative captured this sentiment well:

“Is the solution […]  in the hands of humanitarian organizations? Or in the hands of the Syrian government? Or in the hands of donor countries? Or in the hands of countries that have the decision? All […] must combine their efforts to create a safe and appropriate environment for the refugee to be able to return to his country. […] [I]s this solution a solution from humanitarian organizations, or a political solution, or a diplomatic solution?” (Interview 8, Jordan 2024)

This call for collaboration appeared throughout our interviews. As one participant emphasized:

“I believe that government entities and international and local organizations play a pivotal role in facilitating return by ensuring the safety of refugees, rehabilitating infrastructure and receiving communities, and providing all necessary support to ensure safe and stable voluntary returns.” (Interview 21, Jordan 2024)

Similar arguments can be found in the literature, where scholars emphasize the importance of collaboration and shared responsibility. For instance, Yazıcı Başar (2024) suggests that to protect returnees from potential harm in their country of origin, the preventive Pillar of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) could be applied. This solution would rely on responsibility-sharing, involving the host country, the UNHCR, and the international community (i.e. nation-states, international organizations, regional entities, and other key stakeholders).

Repatriation vs. Refugee Protection

In addition to emphasizing the importance of a collaborative approach, many of the interviewed NGOs adopted the UNHCR’s terminology of ‘voluntary, safe, and dignified’ returns, reinforcing its key role in refugee repatriation. They did this despite repeated concerns that the UNHCR seems to prioritize repatriation over refugee protection, pushing for return even when conditions in the country of origin remain unsafe.

One interviewee noted: “We always advise, referring to the High Commissioner for Refugees and the relevant government agencies, to facilitate the return” (Interview 2, Jordan 2024). Another stated that “the answer will be that UNHCR is the one concerned with this decision and coordinating it with the government” (Interview 6, Jordan 2024).

Nevertheless, the interviewed NGOs seemed not to be in favor of rushed repatriation. On the contrary, they emphasized the importance of addressing concerns about safety, security and economic and political stability in Syria before any return takes place. Rather than focusing solely on repatriation, many advocated for continued international support to host states, such as Jordan, and local organizations.

In this context, they also highlighted that the potential return of Syrian refugees could lead to significantly reduced financial support for their operations. As international funding would likely shift towards Syria to support the reintegration of returnees, NGOs would face fewer resources to continue their work in host countries.

Prioritizing Refugee Voices in Repatriation

A crucial takeaway from both the interviews and the literature is the importance of engaging not only with state authorities (Yazıcı Başar, 2024) but also with refugees themselves (Dinçer & Şahin-Mencütek, 2025). One interviewee remarked:

“State actors need to create the necessary legal and security conditions for return, while INGOs and NGOs can provide essential service and support reintegration efforts. […] [G]rassroots organizations play a vital role in community mobilization and ensuring that the voices of returning refugees are heard.” (Interview 1, Jordan 2024)

This emphasis on consulting refugees directly is echoed by others: “Since they are those most affected, we should first consult the refugees themselves” (Interview 7, Jordan 2024). Another noted, “We must listen to their views and what they want. And talk to them about their opinion on the issue of returning or staying” (Interview 17, Jordan 2024).

Thus, repatriation decisions cannot solely be about state interests or external pressures. Incorporating refugees’ perspectives is key to ensuring their safety, dignity and autonomy throughout the process.

Nelly Müller is a student in the Master’s program on “Changing Societies: Migration – Conflicts – Resources.” As part of a research internship, she contributed to a project funded by the LH MENA Consolidation Grant, which provided the basis for the data collection used in this blog post.

References:

–Abboud, S. (2024). ‘The Decision to Return to Syria Is Not in My Hands’: Syria’s Repatriation Regime as Illiberal Statebuilding. Journal of Refugee Studies, 37(1), 181–200.
–Dhingra, R., & Mourad, L. (2025, January 25). Don’t Rush to Send Syrians Back. Foreign Policy.
–Dinçer, O. B., & Şahin-Mencütek, Z. (2025). Refugee return, reintegration, and citizenship practices in post-conflict Syria. International Migration, 63(1), e13379.
–McGuinness, D. (2024, December 11). Germany’s one million Syrians at centre of fierce political debate over future. BBC News.
–Yazıcı Başar, E. (2024). How safe is the zone, and how voluntarily are the returnees? Turkey’s project for a ‘safe and dignified’ voluntary repatriation of Syrian refugees and the potential implementation of R2P on behalf of returnees. The International Journal of Human Rights, 28(6), 936–968.