We Know a Lot About Ukrainian Refugees

06.03.2024 , in ((Ukrainian Refugees)) , ((No commenti))

Russia’s ‘22 invasion of Ukraine has led to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, with millions of Ukrainians seeking refuge abroad. While international efforts have tried to support the displaced, the scale of migration presents many challenges for host countries. In this context, many social scientists have sought to analyze the situation. With a focus on Ukrainian refugees in Switzerland, the insights gained on demographics, accommodation, employment, social integration, and health, highlight the need for well-balanced policies supporting short-term aid but also long-term integration.

The full-scale invasion of Russia in Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has provoked much international condemnation and concern and led to millions of Ukrainians fleeing their country. While there was much benevolence and solidarity towards the refugees, the sudden arrival of such a large number of people can pose challenges to countries receiving the refugees.

As is common in situations of change, social scientists study the developments and guide interventions with sober analysis. A year in, it was clear that the temporary protection granted to Ukrainian refugees across Europe was likely to last longer, and policymakers increased focus on dual intent: measures that are beneficial for a return to Ukraine as well as a longer stay in the country of residence. With studies published in different forms and places, I realized that it was difficult to keep an overview of what we actually know about Ukrainian refugees and set out to gather the bits and pieces in a narrative review.

Ukrainians in Switzerland – What We Have Managed to Gather

It turns out there was rather more than I anticipated based on an initial review, but my curiosity peaked. As of early 2024, I have identified 135 studies in the broadest sense that examine Ukrainian refugees in Switzerland. The resulting working paper undoubtedly does justice to the ‘working’ part – it’s a document I keep updating as new findings are published. Yet, even at this stage, we can see that we already know many things about Ukrainian refugees and their novel situation as a population with the protection status “S.”

We have a good idea of who they are. Initial media reports did not exaggerate when they highlighted the formal qualifications of Ukrainians, which is linked to high levels of education in Ukraine in general, as well as the higher propensity of highly educated people to flee in cases of conflict and doing so over greater distances. With the ongoing war in Ukraine, many of the refugees are women and children, though we also find families who managed to leave the country without separation.

Accommodation

Regarding their accommodation, for the first time since World War II, host families have played a central role. The willingness of many families to provide temporary abode to Ukrainian refugees has reduced the burden on state actors who are tasked with providing or finding suitable accommodation. The model of guest families is widely considered promising, but with no end to the war in Ukraine in sight, challenges also become apparent. Host families also need support from municipalities, and while they provide important contact with the majority population, there are differences between host families in turning these contacts into productive changes beneficial for the integration of Ukrainian refugees. To what extent this model can be extended to other refugees and temporarily admitted persons remains an open question.

Employment Opportunities

We also know that Ukrainian refugees seek employment, but they struggle to find work for several reasons. While their labor force participation is higher than that of comparable refugees or temporarily admitted persons, two factors are often highlighted: language differences and uncertainty about the eventual return. These challenges affect both potential employers and employees, and many creative ways have been found to integrate thousands of Ukrainians into the labor market. With the uncertainty about the return, the common tension between temporarily accepting work for which one is overqualified, because refugees typically do not want to be a burden on the welfare system, and investing so that adequate work can be found directly because this would mean sustainable integration, is very pronounced for Ukrainian refugees.

Navigating Integration and Return Intentions

Given that temporary protection is by definition focused on return, we know less about the social integration of Ukrainian refugees. Most of them have frequent contact with the majority of society, and they continue to benefit from solidarity and goodwill, as well as positive media reporting. In this sense, the context for integration for Ukrainian refugees and other refugees is different. With an increased focus on dual intent, however, it remains unclear to what extent social and even cultural integration are sought.

The health of Ukrainian refugees has received ample attention, but for many health-related questions, we lack high-quality studies. Given the situation, most research is focused on mental health, but results are conflicting or poorly embedded in existing knowledge. As in other research on Ukrainian refugees, we have snapshots of their mental health, but not enough reflection on whether the scores we obtain mean “good” or “bad.” The high levels of education can be protective factors when it comes to mental health, but situations of war are always traumatizing to some extent. Ad-hoc surveys are often in a poor situation to provide good assessments.

A final topic that is high on the political agenda is return. The protection status “S” is by definition focused on eventual return, and around a third of the refugees plan to return to Ukraine as soon as possible. Many find the situation in Ukraine confusing and complex: they tend to have a basic intention to return to Ukraine, but cannot imagine doing so given the state of affairs. A further third would prefer to stay in Switzerland beyond the immediate war, which does not preclude eventual return once the economy recovers. Experience from other conflicts suggests that return intentions decline over time, especially when children grow up in Switzerland – this is what integration means in practice.

Didier Ruedin is a Senior Lecturer at the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies at the University of Neuchâtel and a Project Leader of the nccr – on the move project Narratives of Crisis and Their Influence in Shaping Discourses and Policies of Migration and Mobility.

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