Racializing and Oppressive Practices at the Eastern Border of Poland

It has been a year since the humanitarian crisis began on the Polish-Belarussian border, where a group of Afghan refugees was trapped. After spending several days there, the refugees were pushed back to the Belarusian side by the Polish border guards. Since then, numerous reports of violence towards refugees, but also local communities and activists have surfaced. These circumstances seem to have unfortunately led to an even more hostile environment for people seeking asylum.

During the past months, the reported practices of the Polish authorities have not only been in clear conflict with international human rights law, but also violated the rights of the local populations (Amnesty International 2022, Border Group 2021, Human Rights Watch 2021).  A series of radical steps have been introduced, such as the declaration of a state of emergency, restrictions on the freedom of media, and the banning of activists, and other people providing medical and humanitarian aid, from entering the border area. Moreover, the Polish legislation was changed in a way to further affect human rights and the standards of human life protection (Border Group 2021).

As the events at the border gradually unveiled, one would have imagined that such blatant demonstrations of ignorance, bad faith and negligence of the rule of law could not officially continue to take place. Yet, it seemed that the situation was not going to change anytime soon. Moreover, Poland’s eastern border has also witnessed similar events for the past few years without making any headlines (Górczyńska, Szczepanik 2016).

Everyday Broder Crossings

During a chilly day in mid-March 2022, we drove with researchers and activists from the Researchers on the Border to Bohoniki, known as one of the locations where a small minority of Polish Tatars live. That day, we attended a funeral of a young Yemeni, who had already been the fifth victim of a humanitarian crisis on the Polish-Belarussian borderland, buried at the local cemetery. Since the area is near the “no-go” zone, checks are more frequent than anywhere else in Poland, with either police, border guards, army, or territorial defense units patrolling the local roads. These are among the many changes related to the securitization and militarization of this borderland (Krępa, 2022).

Residents of the “no-go” zone reported having to answer numerous questions concerning their daily commutes when leaving and re-entering the zone. Checks were also frequent and time-consuming outside of the zone.  That day, as we were driving, we were pulled over by the police:

“Are all of you Polish here?” – asked the police officer looking briefly at our faces. “Because if not, then we would have to check.”

To our surprise, this short exchange of words was not followed by a document check.  What was checked was whether our physical appearance would raise suspicion. As we were all white, we passed as Poles. Similar types of checks were patiently endured by locals several times a day, even if they reported feelings of frustration and bitterness.

“I am local. I live here. What are they protecting me from? They just stop me all the time, asking the same questions, and that makes no sense,” one person told us.

As our conversation progressed, we learned more about the everyday crossings and the confusion that the locals found themselves in. According to volunteers as well as our own experience, beyond being intrusive, disruptive and oppressive, these acts subconsciously legitimize the racial hierarchy at the eastern border of the EU (Balogun 2020).

Daily Routine

Given that the activists were providing humanitarian aid in the Białowieża’s forests, which had become increasingly criminalized in recent months, further attention from the police, border guards or army officers was what they least wanted.

We were told about being routinely controlled by the soldiers, outside of the zone, with long firearms across their chests. For some, as we learned, it was a paralyzing experience, making it extremely difficult for them to react. Vulnerability seemed to be used against the locals by the authorities, who reportedly did not introduce themselves, nor provide a legal basis for the checks, or explain who they were and why they were proceeding to check everyone. Moreover, the authorities were reportedly invading the locals’ and activists’ private spheres by demanding to have access to their unlocked mobile phones and searching the cars.

‘Weaponization’ of migration and refugee issues, as it has been described on the eastern border of Poland since August 2021, means that these issues are seen primarily as a weapon in a ‘hybrid warfare/threat’ (as referred to by the EU institutions). This approach of ‘weaponization’ of migration is not only dehumanizing the people stranded there, but it justifies the special measures, such as the ‘pushbacks,’ as an almost unanimous response from the countries neighboring Belarus (Bender 2021).

Impact of Oppressive Practices on Local Populations

The framing of the situation as a ‘man-made migration crisis,’ justifies the different responses from those already provided by the law. Following this perverse logic, the ‘pushbacks’ observed at the Polish-Belarussian border are not the same as those observed at the other external EU borders, where the migration routes ‘grew naturally’ (Border Group 2021). In this case, the events that take place also harm the local populations, forcing them to witness the increasing violence towards the “others,” and experience other forms of violence and oppression themselves, which are by no means comparable.

Additionally, in the shadow of the suffering of the people on the move that results from this ongoing humanitarian crisis, other ambiguous processes are occurring that strongly affect the local communities. The everyday violence and oppression that they endure, as well as their normalization, have consequences.

My aim in writing this piece was not to take the attention away from those, who are trapped in the forests and instrumentalized in the political game between Belarus and the West. Rather, it was to caution that the violence towards local communities in the borderlands, and society at large, will only further develop a more hostile environment for all the people on the move.

Kamila Fiałkowska is a researcher at the Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw. Her research focuses on work migration from/to Poland (seasonal migration and migration of Polish Roma). Since autumn 2021, she is a member of Researchers at the Border collective.

References:

–Amnesty International. (2022) Poland: cruelty not compassion, at Europe’s other borders. Date accessed: 22.06.2022.
–Balogun B. (2020). Race and racism in Poland: Theorising and contextualising ‘Polish-centrism.’ The Sociological Review. 68(6):1196-1211.
–Bender F. (2022) Against ‘weaponised migration’. Social Europe. Date accessed 22.06.2022.
–Border Group (2021). Humanitarian crisis at the Polish Belarussian Border. Report. Date accessed: 22.06.2022.
–Human Rights Watch (2021). Die here or go to Poland. Belarus’ and Poland’s Shared Responsibility for Border Abuses. Accessed at 22.06.2022.
–M. Górczyńska, M. Szczepanik (2016) “Road to nowhere” – report from Brest-Terespol border crossing. Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. Date accessed: 22.06.2022.
–M. Krępa (2022). Granice czyjego bezpieczeństwa? Spojrzenie na granicę z perspektywy relacji społecznej [Borders of whose security? Looking at the border from the perspective of social relations]. Researcher at the Border. Date accessed 22.06.2022.