Why Such a Change of Heart in Refugee Response in Hungary?

The forced displacement from bordering Ukraine towards Hungary seems to have all but evaporated a decade-long effort to build a fortress of Hungary by its ruling Fidesz party. How is this U-turn in refugee reception to be understood? Due to the government’s strong ethnopopulism and its narrative of ethnic inclusiveness, Hungary has been obliged to welcome all Hungaro-Ukrainians into the country. As it has not been able to convincingly differentiate between double citizens – Hungaro-Ukrainians – and those with ‘only’ Ukrainian citizenship, the Hungarian government has created a situation of stalemate where its formerly closed nature in asylum matters seems to have imploded.

The Republic of Hungary, this EU member state at the South-Eastern border of the Schengen area, has become known in the last decade for its heavy-handed asylum policies. Following two decades of internationalization and Europeanization in the fields of asylum and migration policy, Hungary unveiled its unique migration strategy in 2014. This very document (European Commission 2014) foresaw a balanced approach, pointing towards possible benefits of immigration while equally acknowledging its challenges.

However, even before this document could be implemented, the crisis of European policy-making on migration and asylum of the years 2014 to 2015 (Schulze Wessel 2017), known as the “refugee crisis,” brought about a complete change in the government’s approach to all matters related to migration. The trajectory of adherence to European and international norms and rules in asylum reception and migration management was abandoned. What followed was a series of measures that delineated the new Hungarian approach for gatekeeping, neglect, and disregard.

From Progress to Refusal to Open Borders

As a result, Hungary is now one of the most pronounced adversaries of a humane approach to receiving asylum seekers. It is also one of the most vocal proponents of closed borders within the EU, having almost single-handedly closed the “Balkan Route” in the autumn of 2015. Ever since, the Hungarian government ruled by the Fidesz party has steadily dismantled the provisions for all refugee protection. By March 2020, the government had installed a system by which it was no longer possible to claim asylum at the Hungarian border or within the country.  Instead, a uniquely designed embassy system, with either Belgrade (Serbia) or Kyiv (Ukraine) left as the only two entry points, was implemented. Since then, a total of 12 persons have been allowed to enter Hungary and apply for asylum.

The extreme position of Hungary can be seen as an attempt to barricade from asylum seekers trying to enter its territory. It also means that its measures are now in breach of the EU law on asylum. Given these circumstances, it was unfathomable that the Hungarian government would reconsider its position on asylum to allow the opening of borders, providing substantial funding and other resources to accommodate displaced people from Ukraine appropriately. However, this is exactly what happened in the days following the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian forces.

Ethnic Exclusiveness

The act of barricading from the outside is based on an exceptionally strong narrative of ethnic exclusivity. This narrative is historically rooted in post-WWI events, when the then ‘Greater Hungary’ lost two-thirds of its territory and an even larger proportion of its population according to the peace agreement imposed by the victorious powers.

This Hungarian ‘loss’ has been used by the Fidesz-run government to redefine who belongs to the Hungarian nation and who does not. Formally, this “belonging” is codified in the citizenship law, which is the most reliant on “ius sanguinis” out of all EU member states – that is, citizenship is acquired by the nationality or ethnicity of one or both parents, grandparents, or even later generations. Practically, strong linkages are created to ethnic Hungarians in the whole region, particularly via heavily funded cultural activities. These regions include territories to the South and South-West of Hungary, but also towards the East in Ukraine.

The Importance of the Hungarian Diaspora in the Region

The narrative of “Hungarianess” draws on bloodline and biological descent as well as on the knowledge of the Hungarian language – admittedly, one of the most difficult to speak for non-natives – as decisive factors for belonging and non-belonging. It serves as the basis for the strong ethnopopulism promoted by the Fidesz ruling party since gaining power again in 2010.

Importantly, it also served to justify changes in the citizenship and electoral laws, meaning hundreds of thousands of people of Hungarian descent, living outside its current territory, have been given access to the Hungarian passport, often in the form of a second citizenship. For this generous inclusion, loyal support by these ‘Hungarians-across-the-border’ has ultimately won Fidesz the supermajority in every parliamentary election since (i.e. 2014, 2018, 2022). In Ukraine alone, the Hungarian government has issued around 130.000-second passports.

No Policy Reversal After All

When the war in Ukraine started, it had looked as if Hungary had shifted its previous position refusing to allow asylum seekers onto its territory and had opened its borders for their unhindered entry. By zooming in on the actual situation, it seems that many of those who first arrived in Hungary – by sheer proximity – were not simply Ukrainians, but Ukrainians from the former Hungarian territory of Transcarpathia, with potential Hungarian ancestry and most possibly a second, Hungarian passport. Hence, they could not have been refused entry legally, and thanks to the strong narrative of belonging, they were instead welcomed with open arms.

So, what had seemed like a full-fledged policy reversal on asylum, must, in fact, rather be considered a continuation of a well-trodden path of ethnic nationalism. This explains why the treatment of those displaced by the war in Ukraine differs so vastly from the treatment of other asylum seekers.

The Two-Faced Hungarian Refugee Response

From a Western, European perspective, the provision of shelter, aid, and other forms of support to those displaced by the war in Ukraine may seem like Hungary is finally adhering to EU rules and regulations, and living up to its obligation of asylum provision. From an internal perspective, however, this is not the case.

Similarly, when looking at Hungarian aid shipments going to the border region of Transcaparthia – from a Western European point of view it goes to Ukraine. But from a Hungarian perspective aid is limited to the area historically connected to Hungary and populated by its citizens. What seems like a gesture of solidarity, is in fact not one. What appears to be a change in refugee reception policy seems indeed to be an expression of ethnic exclusivity by the Fidesz-ruled government.

A Tragic Ending

Indeed, the Russian war on Ukraine has demonstrated the arbitrariness of refugee reception in Hungary. The support that is now pouring out has been made available neither to the previous group of asylum seekers, namely those displaced by the Civil War in Syria, nor to those already in the country living in squalid conditions e.g. parts of the Hungarian Romani population. This approach points to a hierarchy of deservingness and highlights discrimination within refugee populations already described by other scholars (Dahinden 2022).

While not marking the end of Hungarian ethnopopulism, nativism and the era of the “fortress Hungary,” the disguised support of Putin and the attempts at blocking further sanctions towards Russia seem to have led to the implosion of Visegrád-Group, namely Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland. These countries had previously formed an alliance against progressive developments in asylum and migration policy in Europe. Ironically, the very topic of refugee reception and asylum, which they formerly agreed on, also sees the end of their unity.

Jenna Althoff is an associated researcher within the nccr ⁠— on the move, analyzing claims-making in times of crisis in post-soviet welfare states. She is also currently a senior researcher with MIDEM, the Mercator Forum on Migration & Democracy at the Technical University of Dresden.

References:

– Althoff, Jenna (2022): Länderbericht Ungarn, MIDEM Länderberichte, Technische Universität Dresden, Dresden.
– Dahinden, Janine (2022): A Call for Solidarity with All Refugees, Beyond Double Standards!, nccr — on the move, blog series « Europe on the Brink », Université Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel.
– European Commission (2014): Hungary’s Migration Strategy, (last accessed: 16.05.2022).
– Schulze Wessel, Julia (2017): Krise! Welche Krise?; in: Walter, Franz (Hg.): Europa ohne Identität? Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, S. 62-66.