Context Matters: On the Niqab and its Context
Context matters. On 7 March 2021, the Swiss electorate will vote on the popular initiative “Yes to a ban on full facial coverings”. To separate the niqab from its religious social and political contexts and turn it into a simple question of ‘choice’ is to miss out on a great deal of nuance and complexity. This larger context is also relevant to Switzerland. Ignoring it will not make it disappear.
“The ’burqa’ is primarily a discursive phenomenon. It is discussed more often in the media and politics than that it is actually worn on the street” (Tunger-Zanetti 2021)
In anticipation of the initiative vote, my cherished colleague Andreas Tunger-Zanetti has published the book “Verhüllung: Die Burka Debatte in der Schweiz”, which sought to provide arguments against the ban. The author focused on two key areas. First, it sought to ascertain the number of Muslim women wearing the niqab in Switzerland and their motivations for doing so. Second, it provided an analysis of the Swiss discourse on the full-face veil. My interest here is in reflecting on the first dimension because I see the niqab as more than just a discursive phenomenon.
A Portrait of the Niqabi Women in Europe
The book, based on results of studies in various countries, creates the following profile of niqabi women. The vast majority of niqab wearers were born in the Western European country where they live now or were at least socialized there as children. They are between 18 and 35 years old, almost half of them discovered religion only during adolescence, either because their Muslim family of origin was secularly oriented or because they converted to Islam. Finally, many niqab wearers have a solid education, some have jobs outside the home, and the women are wearing the niqab of their free will. For these women, the niqab is emancipatory.
I do not dispute these findings – not when it concerns this specific type of demographic within the niqabi wearers. They are women who converted to Islam or are ‘born again Muslims’ and who have chosen to live in a very specific puritanical type of Islam. But just like their male partners, they often tend to be missionary activists for their new-found religious identity: a reconstructed identity within an environment they perceive as confusing and hostile. They also tend to socialize within a closed net of like-minded groups, in a situation akin to a sect using the words “sisters” and “brothers” for persons who share their religious affiliation. The main expression they hear when they enter this sect is that “Islam erases the life before”. In other words, once you decide to join, you are a new person.
What was striking in Mr. Tunger-Zanetti’s study is the absence of the ideological, political and social contexts that surround the wearing of the niqab in European countries. It is as if the niqab came out of nowhere and these women have decided to embrace it on a whim.
I understand that the discursive context is important, but it does not tell us anything about the phenomenon we are addressing here. After all, why would these women decide of their own free will to wear the niqab, especially as it is considered today to be a fringe tradition, contested within Muslim countries, described as extreme and rejected by traditional Islam?
Which Ideology Brought these Women to Cover themselves from Head to Toe?
I think no one will claim that the niqab was present on the streets of Egypt and Tunisia in the 1960s, nor was it seen on the streets of Birmingham in Britain, the suburbs in France, in Molenbeek or Johannesburg. That is not the case today. Wherever neo-fundamentalist interpretations of Islam start to appear, with their structures and resources, the niqab follows. This is a causal relationship, not merely a correlation.
Given its relevance, I will focus here on the Salafi teachings on women and on its theological features, and specifically on the quietist missionary form of Salafism. It is based on the religious opinions of sheikhs, who are considered to be sacred authorities by their followers. So what do these sheikhs preach to and about women? You find the answer in a 528-page book, used as a major reference and called “The Fatwas (religious edicts) on Women”. It was written by four Salafi sheikhs and it provides their religious opinions on women, their bodies, and how they should behave.
Throughout the book, the message is clear. Because any woman is sexual, everything about her should be concealed: her voice, her face, her hands, her palms and even her feet when she prays. All should be carefully covered. Girls should wear the hijab as early as age six but any girl who has a shapely heavy body that can arouse the sexual desires of men should wear the niqab as well. And in any case, it would be good for girls to get used to the veil from an early age. Women and girls should not wear tight clothes in front of their fathers, brothers and uncles. The fear here is that the men might be sexually aroused by their daughters, sisters or nieces. Segregation between the sexes is a divine order meant to protect both sexes from temptation. For the wife, and I am quoting here, the husband is a ‘master’; for him, she is a ‘captive’ and ‘she should obey him’ in wearing the veil and following other orders ‘because if she obeys him, she obeys god’.
Wearing the Niqab Goes Beyond a Sole Lifestyle Choice
The visual manifestation of the niqab should not be either accepted or mainstreamed as a harmless ‘lifestyle’ choice. These sheikhs do not restrict their reading of religion only to women. They provide a much wider vision of political, social and religious order. According to the Fatwas, women should abandon their families, including their parents, if they do not see them following the ‘right’ Islamic path. This advice is connected to a theological feature of Salafism, called “the principle of loyalty and disavowal”. According to this principle, true Muslims must not only love and hold fast to everything that God commands and approves of; in addition, they must withdraw from, oppose, and hate everything God disapproves of and forbids. This everything includes behaviors, customs, traditions, and other humans. Hence, to the followers of Salafism, true Muslims have to be openly hostile to polytheists and proclaim their hatred of them; this prohibits any kind of friendly association with them. Either they separate themselves from the polytheists or they migrate to a place where true Islam is practiced (a concept of migration called hijrah).
These Salafi teachings have had clear ramifications for Muslim-majority countries and for minority groups of Islamic faith in Western democracies. When this type of Islam spreads in a community, it turns it into a self-imposed closed ghetto: It tells people to literally hate their surroundings and separate themselves from other non-Muslims. They cannot socialize with them, they cannot eat together or visit. They cannot have them as friends, and they cannot imitate them. This uproots many of the Islamic traditions in these communities, eradicating their rich diversity and replacing it with rigid uncompromising teaching. Clearly, it divides entire families and communities.
This explains why the rich and tolerant forms of North African Islam in France or Belgium have been replaced by a radicalized form of religion shaped by this Salafism and other forms of Islamism.
Status Quo in Switzerland
The sheikhs’ books and fatwas are not only being taught and promoted in Gulf-funded madrasas and mosques. What these men say has also relevance in our European societies. Take the example of the closed communities in French banlieues, the working-class suburbs that ring the major cities, which have become fertile recruiting grounds for Islamist groups. The state itself contributed to the separation of its banlieues by neglecting them. One consequence was that the youth were left to unemployment, xenophobia, poverty and a macho code of behavior. The state’s absence left a vacuum that was filled by Islamist structures, generously supported by transnational Islamist organizations and governments.
Switzerland does not have the kind of segregated closed communities we see in France, Belgium, and Britain. But there are tendencies in some cities where certain ethnic groups and strata are strongly represented, such as Kleinbasel in Basel or Schlieren in Zurich.
The Social Context Matters
The vast majority of Swiss Muslims do not see any contradiction between their faith and the democratic and free structures of Switzerland. A very small minority may approve of Salafi Islam but it remains fringe. That said, the country is not immune to Salafism. Granted, it is still in its nascent form, but I suggest we closely watch the interaction between the centres of Salafi influence in Switzerland and in neighbouring countries, over the borders of cantons such as Basel and Geneva. It is also important to consider the way that the spread of Arabized Salafism in countries such as Albania and Kosovo is echoed and mirrored among some groups of Swiss Muslims from these countries. Notice that I am restricting my observations here to the Salafi form.
I do not think that prohibiting the wearing of the niqab will provide any solutions to other problems we are having in Switzerland. But I think it should be fairly clear by now that we are talking about an extremist far-right religious ideology: It preaches the necessity of segregating the genders, subordinating women, and teaching people to hate their surroundings and separate themselves from anyone who is not a follower of their sect.
This brings me to the number issue: Does the number mean that we do not have a problem because they are only 37 women? What if they were 3000 niqabi women, should we worry then? If it is a matter of principle, the number should not make a difference. It does matter because if the numbers are higher, it will cease to be portrayed as a lifestyle choice and issues of social cohesion would draw to the focus. By the same token, it is one thing to say that a sample of women interviewed in its study and other studies cited in it are wearing the niqab of their own free will. It is another to say all niqabis in Europe are wearing it as a free choice. There are plenty of books by former niqabi, who write about their experiences and the pressure (including physical violence) they endured.
Born-again Muslims and converts to Islam may find it “emancipating” to wear the niqab. But what happens to all these women and girls who try to defy the dress code and the social control of Islamists in the French suburbs? Girls and women are pressured to wear the veil, pushed to leave school, and forced to marry early. Those who defy the imposed social order are harassed and gang-raped.
Ignoring the context will not make it go away and reduce the niqab to an individualistic lifestyle issue. The erasing of the woman’s body is based on an extremist religious far-right ideology and it functions within a social context. I understand that my cherished colleague and other like-minded intellectuals are worried about the stigmatization of Swiss Muslims, in their rich diversity. I share that worry as well. But that should not stop us from posing critical questions or ignoring the whole theological and social contexts.
If some young women decide to embrace that fundamentalist religious interpretation, that is their choice. But it should be clear that the term ‘freedom of choice’ being used here is tailored specifically to the democratic settings of Western societies. The religious ideology that promotes it does not see freedom of choice when it is in power. It is totalitarian in its very nature.
PD Dr. Elham Manea is a Privatdozentin (equivalent to associate Professor) at the Political Science Institute, University of Zurich, a writer and human rights advocate. Her research focuses on countries of the Arabian Peninsula, Gender & Women under Muslim Laws, and Islamism.
Note from the author: It was Mr. Tunger-Zanetti’s interview on NZZ that made me agree to an interview with the Sonntagszeitung. His response to my interview with the Sonntagszeitung interview itself was published on the legal Website «Unser Recht».
You can find the original version with more details and examples of studies on the DeFacto Expert blog published on 18.02.2021 in German and in French as well as a related blog contribution written by Andreas Tunger-Zanetti and Nina Baghdadi.
