Lutz, Philipp, David Kaufmann and Anna Stünzi

Humanitarian protection as a European public good: The strategic role of states and refugees
2020

The recent surge of refugee arrivals in Europe has accentuated the malfunctioning of the Common European Asylum System: Non-coordination between nation states and a failed common protection of refugees were the main outcomes of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’. This paper builds on public good and policy compliance literature in order to explain the failure of European countries to provide humanitarian protection to refugees. A sequential game-theoretical model serves to demonstrate the strategic interaction between member states and refugees in European asylum policy. The analysis demonstrates that although both actors benefit from a functioning European asylum system, they also have few incentives to contribute to the public good. States aim to reduce their individual refugee-burden, and refugees seek protection in their preferred destination country. The findings suggest that an effective provision of refugee protection requires both member states and refugees to mutually contribute to the public good.